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AGORA: MILITARY COMMISSIONS
sure. In a liberal polity, one wishes to assure trial procedures that are as generous as possible,
even amid the exigencies of a very real conflict.
Still, the problems of a different kind of war remain, especially for any trials that are con-
vened in the middle of the battle. Some Al Qaeda actors may simply be held for the duration
of an arduous conflict, as combatants captured in war, subject to administrative safeguards.
Should criminal trials be held, we may wish to acknowledge that our familiar habits from civil-
ian courts and United Nations tribunals are not the only models of fairness. The humanitarian
law of war and the law of armed conflict are equally a part of international law, framed to meet
the unsought circumstances of states that must protect the safety of their citizens.
RUTH WEDGWOOD*
THE CASE AGAINST MILITARY COMMISSIONS
InJanuary 2002, Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national of Moroccan descent, pleaded not
guilty in Virginia federal court to six counts of conspiring to commit acts of international ter-
rorism in connection with the September 11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade
Center.' In other times, it would have seemed unremarkable for someone charged with con-
spiring to murder American citizens and destroy American property on American soil to be
tried in a U.S. civilian court. More than two centuries ago, Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of
the United States Constitution granted Congress the power to "define and punish Piracies"
Felonies committed on the High Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations," a power that
Congress immediately exercised by criminalizing piracy, the eighteenth-century version of
modern terrorism.' Since then, Congress has criminalized numerous other international of-
fenses. 3 In recent decades, United States courts have decided criminal cases convicting inter-
national hijackers, terrorists, and drug smugglers,4 as well as a string of well-publicized civil
lawsuits adjudicating gross human rights violations. 5 Most pertinent, federal prosecutors have
successfully tried and convicted in U.S. courts numerous members of Al Qaeda, the very ter-
rorist group charged with planning the September 11 attacks, for earlier attacks on the World
Trade Center and the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.'
Had only three or three hundred died on September 11, no one would have suggested that
their murderers be tried anywhere but in U.S. civilian courts. This history made even more
surprising President Bush's military order (Military Order), issued on November 13, 2001, with-
Of the Board of Editors.
'Brooke A. Masters, Invoking Allah, Terror Suspect Enters No Plea: U.S. Judge in Alexandria Schedules October Trial,
WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2002, at Al.
2 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §8, 1 Stat. 112, 113-14.
3 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §1201 (aircraft sabotage and kidnapping act), §1203 (criminalizing hostage taking), §831 (theft
of nuclear materials) (2000).
' See, e.g., United States v. McVeigh, 9 Fed. Appx. 980 (10th Cir. 2001), 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 11804 (unpublished);
United States v. Noriega, 683 F.Supp. 1373 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (trying Panamanian leader who was apprehended by
U.S. Special Forces after extended military operations).
5 See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); In re Estate of
Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1472-76 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980). See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YE L.J. 2347 (199 1)
(reviewing litigation trend).
See Charisse Jones, Four Guilty in U.S. Embassy Attacks: Two Bombings in Africa Killed 224, USA TODAY, May 30,
2001, at IA; MarthaT. Moore, Bomb VerdictsAre2nd Victoryfor Government, USATODAY, Nov. 13,1997, at 3A. Under
the Classified Information Procedures Act, U.S. prosecutors have regularly used special pretrial procedures in
these cases to protect classified information. 18 U.S.C. app. 696, §1 (2000). Seegenemallv Richard P. Salgado, Govern-
ment Secrets, Fair Trials, and the Classied Information Procedures Act, 98 YALE L.J. 427 (1988) (describing practice
under the Act); Bill Keller, Trials and Tribulations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2001, at A31 ("Over the past eight years the
U.S. attorney [for the Southern District of New York] ... has successfully prosecuted 26jihad conspirators, in six
major trials and some minor ones.").
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out congressional authorization or consultation, which declared that "[t] o protect the United
States and its citizens, ... it is necessary for (noncitizen suspects designated by the president
under the order) ... to be tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military
tribunals."7 It came as no surprise, however, that the Military Order quickly attracted intense
criticism from constitutional and international lawyers. That response has triggered a legal
process of narrowing the order that seems likely to continue until the first commission cases
are brought."
Nevertheless, the practical question remains: given the exigencies created by the events
of September 11, why should the United States not have the option of trying suspected ter-
rorists before military commissions? Two simple answers: First, the Military Order under-
mines the United States' perceived commitment to the rule of law and national confidence
in U.S.judicial institutions at precisely the time when that commitment and confidence are
most needed. Second, by failing to deliverjustice that the world at large will find credible,
the Military Order undermines the U.S. ability to lead an international campaign against ter-
rorism under a rule-of-law banner.
I. How COMMISSIONS FAIL
Undermining the Rule of Law
The Military Order's specific legal deficiencies have received extensive commentary and
are cogently summarized in a recent letter to the chair of the Senate Committee on thejudi-
ciary signed by more than seven hundred American law professors. " On its face, the order au-
thorizes the Department of Defense to dispense with the basic procedural guarantees required
by the Bill of Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the
7 Militar' Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism § 1 (e)(Nov. 13,2001), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16,2001) [hereinafter Military Order] (emphasis added). The Military
Order provides: (1) that "it is not practicable to apply in military commissions under this order the principles of
law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States districtcourts";
(2) that trials need not be open; (3) that conviction and sentencing shall be "only upon the concurrence of two-
thirds of the members of the commission"; and (4) that defendants "shall not be privileged to seek any remedy
or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly," in any U.S., foreign, or international court. Id. §§1 (f), 4(c) (4),
4(c) (6)-(7), 7(b) (2).
See George Lardner,Jr., On Left and Right, Concern OverAnti-Terrorism Moves: Administration Actions Threaten Civil
Liberties, Critics Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2001, at A40.
" The president's legal coMsel subsequently asserted that the order "covers only foreign enemy war criminals"
who are chargeable "with offenses against the international laws of war"; that the order "does not require that any
trial, or even portions of a trial, be conducted in secret"; that "[e]veryone tried before a military commission will
know the charges against him, be represented by qualified counsel and be allowed to present a defense"; and that
"anyone arrested, detained or tried in the United Suites by a military commission will be able to challenge the law-
fulness of the commission's jurisdiction through a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal court." Alberto R.
Gonzales, MlaiialJustice, Full and Fai N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27. While the regulations issued by the De-
partment of Defense after this essay was written (U.S. Dep't of Defense, Military Commissions Order No. 1, Pro-
cedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism
(Mar. 21,2002), at<http://vwv.defenseink.mil/news/Mar2002/d120020321 ord.pdf>) respond to the heated cit-
icism of the Military Order by providing more courtlike guarantees, they pointedly omit any opportunity for judi-
cial review before a civ'ilian coort. The irony, as I suggest in the text, is that proceedings before these commissions
will now be likely to sutiffer from many of the inefficiencies associated with judicial proceedings, but without gar-
nering in return the global respect that genuine, credible judicial proceedings are accorded.
"0 Letter friom Law Professors and Lawtvyers to the Honorable Patrick J. leahv (Dec. 5,2001), at <http://Avw.yale.edii/
lavsAveb/liman/letterleahy.pdf> [hereinafter Law Professors' Letter]. Those law protssors (including this author)
called "the untested institutions contemplated by the Order ... legally deficient, unnecessary, and unwise." In
particular, they argued that the order violates separation of powers, "does not comport with either constitltional
or international standards ofdtue process," and "allows the Executive to violate the United States' bintling treaty
obligations." For devastating critiques of the Military Order tnder American constitutional law, sec, for example,
Neal KI Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259
(2002) (arguing that order is Unconstitutional on its face); George P. Fletcher, War and the Constitution: Blush's
Militaty Tribunals Haven't Got a Legal Leg to Stand On, AM. PROSI'ECT,Jan. 1-14, 2002, at 26.
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Third Geneva Convention of 1949."1 Insofar as any of these guarantees-which include the
presumption of innocence, the rights to be informed of charges and to equal treatment
before the courts, public hearings, independent and impartial decision makers, the rights
to speedy trial, confrontation, and counsel of one's own choosing, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and review by a higher tribunal according to law-are subject to suspension
in time of emergency, the Bush administration has taken no formal steps to enable it to der-
ogate from them.'" By omitting these guarantees, the Military Order violates binding U.S.
treaty commitments under both the ICCPR and the Third Geneva Convention.'"
Fundamentally, the Military Order undermines the constitutional principle of separation
of powers. For under the order, the president directs his subordinates to create military
commissions, to determine who shall be tried before them, and to choose the finders of fact,
law, and guilt. However detailed its rules and procedures may be, a military commission is
not an independent court, and its commissioners are not genuinely independent decision
makers. Historically, a military commission is neither a court nor a tribunal, but "an advisory
board of officers, convened for the purpose of informing the conscience of the command-
ing officer, in cases where he might act for himself if he chose."'" Commissioners are not
independentjudges, but usually military officers who are ultimately answerable to the sec-
retary of defense and the president, who prosecute the cases. 1 '"Such blending of functions
in one branch of the Government," Justice Black recognized, "is the objectionable thing
which the draftsmen of the Constitution endeavored to prevent by providing for the sepa-
ration of governmental powers."''"
Admittedly, in Exparte Quirin, a pressured Supreme Court upheld the use of World War
II military commissions, reasoning that Nazi saboteurs who had entered the United States
" U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, VIII; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 14,
999 UNTS 171 [her einafter ICC PR]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Arts.
4-5, 6 UST 3316, 75 UNTS 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]: see also Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of
Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Thnorism, 96 AJIL 345 (2002); Dar% IA. Mundis, The Use of Militay
Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 AJIL 320 (2002) (both finding inconsistencies be-
tween administration's position and international standards).
.SeeExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866) (stating that the U.S. Constitution is a "law for rulers
and people, equally in war and in peace.... at all times, and tinder all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more
pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended
during any of the great exigencies of government."). In any event, the Bush administration has taken none of the
requisite steps to declare a state of emergency warranting derogation from its ICCPR obligations. See also The Ad-
ministration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees: Question of Human Rights and States of Emergency,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Suh.2/1997/19, para. 111 (1997) (" [Ml easures adopted by a Government to combat terrorism
should not affect the exercise of the fundamental rights set forth in the Covenant .... Regarding article 14 [fair
trial requirements], the [Human Rights] Committee said that no derogation whatsoever from any of its provisions
was possible.").
"3 Law Professors' Letter, supra note 10 (stating that the ICCPR "obligates States Parties to protect the due pro-
cess rights of all persons subject to any criminal proceeding" and that the Third Geneva Convention "requires that
every prisoner of war have a meaningful right to appeal a sentence or a consiction. Under Article VI of the Con-
stitution, these obligations are the 'supreme Law of the Land' and cannot be superseded by a unilateral presidential
order.").
4 Milligan, 71 U.S. at47 (quoting David DudleyField's Supreme Court argument). Militar' commissioners are even
less independent than court-martialjudges, who operate tinder the statutory protections of the Uniform Code of
MilitaryJustice. Yet as justice Black noted in Reidv. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,36 (1957) (plurality opinion), even "[c]on-
ceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty and sense ofjustice which nearly all of them undoubtedly
have, the members of a court-martial, in the nature of things, do not and cannot have the independence ofjurors
drawn from the general public or of civilian judges."
, Even when sitting American judges have served on military commissions, their independence has been com-
promised because they act as appointees of the executive branch capable of being fired or ordered to decide par-
ticular cases in particular ways. See ROBERT M. COVER, OwTrN M. Fiss, &JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE 1343-45 (1988)
(describing "United States Court for Berlin," an "Article I court" established in 1979 under authorit' of the U.S.
high commissioner for Germany and presided over by Herbert Stern, a sitting Article Illjudge: '..Mter'thatsuit was
filed in Berlin, the United States Ambassador... instructed the judge on how he was to decide the case; the am-
bassador ordered Judge Stern either to dismiss the case or to resign his commission.").
Reid, 354 U.S. at 39.
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clandestinely were "unlawful belligerents," having forfeited their prisoner-of-war status by
removing their uniforms, surreptitiously entering the United States, and committing acts
of sabotage. 17 But Quinin nowhere gave the president carte blanche unilaterally to create an
alternative military system of criminal justice for suspicious aliens captured abroad.'" Nor
did Quiin authorize the president unilaterally to shift all cases involving war crimes by de-
tained noncitizens into military commissions. t" In Quiin, Congress had formally declared war,
which it has not done here, and had specifically authorized the use of military commissions
in its Articles of War. ' In any event, it seriously disserves the long-term interests of the United
States-whose nonuniformed intelligence and military personnel will conduct extensive
armed activities abroad in the months ahead-to assert that any captive who can be labeled
an "unla ful combatant" should be denied prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Conven-
tions, and hence subjected to trial for "war crimes" before military commissions. 2 '
These specific legal deficiencies stand atop a much broader rule-of-law concern. Inter-
national law permits the United States to redress the unprovoked killing of thousands on
September 11, 2001, by itself engaging in an armed attack upon the Al Qaeda perpetrators.
But should those culprits be captured, the United States must try, not lynch, them to pro-
mote four legal values higher than vengeance: holding them accountable for their crimes
against humanity; telling the world the truth about those crimes; reaffirming that such acts vio-
late all norms of civilized society; and demonstrating that law-abiding societies, unlike
'7 317 U.S. 1 (1942). Quirin was itself an embarrassing "tale of'... a prosecution designed to obtain tile death
penalty; ... a rush tojudgment, [and] an agonizing effort tojustify afait accompli." Davidj. Danelski, The Saboteurs'
Case, IJ. S.CT. HisT. 61, 61 (1996).Justice Douglas later recalled the procedure in Quirin, which announced a
result with an opinion following later, as "extretmely undesirable"; Justice Frankfurter, as "not a happy precedent."
Justice Black's law clerk argued that "if the judges are to r-un a court of law and not a butcher shop, the reasons
for killing a nman should be expressed before he is dead; otherwise the proceedings are purely military and not
for courts at all." Id. at 80; accord Robert E. Cushman, Ex parte Quirin et al.-The Nazi Saboteur Case, 28 CORNELL
L.Q. 54 (1942) (recounting rush to judgment).
" Fifteen years after Quiin, justice Black reiterated that "[e]verty extension of militaryjurisdiction," including,
presumably, the assertion of militaryjurisdiction over alien war crimes, "is an encroachment on thejurisdiction
of the civil courts, and, more important, acts as a deprivation of the right tojury trial and of other treasured con-
stitutional protections." Reid, 354 U.S. at 21.
" Far from endorsing sich a broad divestittre of civiliantjurisdiction over war crimes, Congress in 1996 enacted
the War Criimes Act, which plainly envisioned that persons inside or outside the United States who cornmit certain
statutory "war crimes" should be punished before the extant, functioning U.S. courts. War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.
§2441 (2000); accord Reid, 354 U.S. at 41 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the restlt) ("The normal method of trial
of federal offenses Under the Constitution is in a civilian tribunal. Trial of offenses by way of court-martial, with
all the characteristics of its procedure so different from the Forms and safeguards of procedure in the conventional
courts, is an exercise of exceptionaljurisdiction... ").
2-" Quirin carefully specified that "[i] t is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what extent the Pres-
ident as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military commissions without the support (?f Co-
gressional legislation." 317 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added). The Act of Congress passed immediately after September
11 does not autthorize the adjudication by military commissions of past acts by apprehended terrorists. It only
authorizes the president to use "force" againstpersons involved in the September I I attacks so as to prevent future
harm to the United States. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
2 Accord William Glaberson, Critics'Attack on Tribunals Turns to Law Among Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2001,
at BI (citing international lawyers who argue that Military Order conflicts with the Geneva Conventions' guaran-
tees of procedural rights to prisoners of war). Significantly, the first two reported American casualties in Afghan-
istan were a nonuniformed CIA agent killed at a prison riot and a Special Forces officer ambushed while investi-
gating civilian deaths.john Diamond & Liz Sly, Enemy Amnbush Kills US. Soldier; Sunender Talks Continue near Olnar s
Hideout, CHICAGOTRIB.,jan. 5,2002, at I, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File. Under the broad definition
now asserted by the Bush administration, both deceased Americans could have been labeled "unlawful conm-
batants" potentially triable belore military tribunals. This concern makes even itore troubling the White Hoise's
recent, blanket determination that although the Geneva Conventions apply to Taliban detainees (btt not Al
Qaeda), anyone who foltght for tile Taliban violated the laws of war and thus cannot claim prisoncr-of-war status.
White House Fact Sheet, Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002), at <http://wv.whitehotise.gov/news/
releases/2002/02>. A correct application of the Geneva Conventions would have required that all detainees in
U.S. custody be presumed to be prisoners of war until each had his status individually determined by the "com-
petent tribtnal" required by Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention, sutpra note 11. Thus, the president's an-
notinced decision to apply the Geneva Conventions to Taliban detainees should have required him to defer to a
coinpetent tribunal's individualized deterninations as to whether partictilar detainees are entitled to prisoner-of
war status, not allowed him to make his own blanket determination that all detainees are perse tnlawful combatants.
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terrorists, respecl human rights by channeling retribution into criminal punishment for even
the most heinous outlaws.
The Military Order undermines each of these values. First, military commissions create
the impression of kangaroo courts, not legitimate mechanisms of accountability. Second,
rather than openly announcing the truth, commissions tend to hide the very facts and prin-
ciples the United States now seeks to announce to the world. Third, because military tribunals
in Burma, Colombia, Egypt, Peru, Turkey, and elsewhere have been perceived as granting
judgments based on politics, not legal norms, the United States Department of State has regu-
larly pressed to have cases involving U.S. citizens heard in civilian courts in those countries. 22
Those who promote military commissions have been misled by the 0..]. Simpson fiasco to
conclude that standing American courts-whether civilian courts or military courts-mar-
tial-are somehow incapable of rendering full, fair, and expeditioLs justice in such cases.
One might understand a country's resorting to a military commission when no currently func-
tioning court could fairly and efficiently try the case. But over the centuries, the U.S.judicial
system has amply demonstrated its ability to adapt to new, complex problems in criminal
and civil law. Why should the United States try suspects in military commissions without con-
gressional authorization when its own federal courts have fairly and openly tried and con-
victed Al Qaeda members? Perversely, the Military Order threatens national confidence in
existing legal institutions and principlesjust when that confidence is already badly shaken
by horrific terrorist attacks. Despite those attacks, both the presidency and Congress have
continued to function, yet the order implicitly assumes that the third branch, comprising
existing civilian and military courts, can no longer handle the yerv cases it dealt with just be-
fore the attacks occurred."
Fourth and finally, military commissions provide ad hocjustice, hence uncertain protec-
tion for defendants' rights. Although the Defense Department's regulations implementing
the order reportedly provide greater protections for the accused, unlike the Bill of Rights,
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice, those reg-
ulations cannot guarantee those rights, as they are subject to change at the president's will.2 4
The absence of binding legal protection for the accused's human rights will become par-
ticularly acute should military commissions be convened at the United States Naval Base at
Guantinamo Bay, Cuba, where scores of the detainees have been transferred .25 In 1994, when
large numbers of Cuban boat people were held on Guantnamo, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit rendered the extraordinarily broad (and strongly contested) ruling
that "these [alien detainees on Guantfnamo] are without legal rights that are cognizable in
2When Peru, for example, branded Lori Berenson, an American citizen, a "terrorist," the United States
properly protested that her "trial" was not held in open civilian court with foll rights of legal defense. in accordance
with international judicial norms. See U.S. DEPT OF STATE, Per, in 1999 COUNTRy RFiORTS ON HL'M\N RIGHTS
PRACTICES, available at <http://www.state.gov/ww/global/humaniights,/ 1999_hrp.-report,/peru.htnll>.
-: Attorney GeneralJohn Ashcroft's own public defense of the Miliar' Order before Congress was stunning in its
dismissiveness about the capacity of United Statesjudges and federal prosecutors (whose nominations lie oversees)
to try terrorist suspects fairly and expeditiously under existing judicial procedures. See Lane, supra note 10 (quoting
testimony of Attorney GeneralJohn Ashcroft, Senate Committee on theJudiciarY, Dec. 6, 2001 ("Are we supposed
to read [terror suspects] their Miranda rights, hire a flamboyant defense lawyer, bring them back to the United States
to create a new cable network of 'Osama TV,' provide a worldwide pladbrni for propaganda?")).
' Cf Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 119 (1866) ("By the protection of the law human rights are secured;
withdraw that protection, and they are at the mercy ofwicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited people."). Under
the so-called Charining Betsv principle, U.S. courts have regularly restrained proposed executive action within the
bounds of international legal obligations. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804) (Marshall, C.J.). Seegeneraly Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role ofInternational Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutor
Construction, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1103 (1990). To the extent that both the Third Geneva Convention and the ICCPR
represent customaiy international law, fidelity to binding international obligations should require that the open-
ended language of the Militay Order be construed to require the procedural guarantees required by those instruments.
2, Katharine Q. Seelye, Troops Arnive at Bise in Cuba to BuildJails, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 7, 2002. at A8 (Defense Secre-
tary "Rumsfeld said he had not ruled out holding such tribunals at Gtiantuinamo Bay").
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the courts of the United States.""5 Read literally, the panel's holding would permit American'
officials deliberately to starve the alien detainees, to subject them to forced sterilizations,
or to discriminate against them on the basis of their religion or skin color. Yet given the
persistent U.S. criticism of Communist Cuba for violating the rights of its prisoners over the
past forty years, it would be supremely ironic if the United States now created its own rights-
free zone for alien detainees on that part of Cuba under American jurisdiction. 7
Undermining Moral Leadership
The use of military commissions potentially endangers Americans overseas by undermin-
ing the U.S. government's ability to protest effectively when other countries use such tribu-
nals. But just as troubling, espousing military commissions undermines U.S. moral leader-
ship abroad when that leadership is needed the most." The United States regularly takes
other countries to task for military proceedings that violate basic civil rights. How, then, can
the United States be surprised when its European allies refuse to extradite captured terrorist
suspects to U.S. military justice? When the Chinese or Russians try Uighur or Chechen
Muslims as terrorists in military courts, U.S. diplomats protest vigorously and the world con-
demns those tribunals as anti-Muslim. How, then, can the United States object when other
countries choose to treat U.S. military commissions the same way?
To win a global war against terrorism, nations that lay claim to moral rectitude and fidelity
to the rule of law must not only apply, but also be universally seen to be applying, credible jus-
tice. Crediblejustice for international crimes demands tribunals that are fair and impartial both
in fact and in appearance. By their very nature, military tribunals fail this test. Even if, through
tinkering, the Defense Department's regulations could ensure that military commissions will
operate more fairly in fact, they will never be perceived as fair by those skeptical of their polit-
ical purpose, namely, the very Muslim nations whose continuing support the United States
needs to maintain its durable coalition against terrorism. Ironically, the more the Defense
Department tries to address the perceived unfairness of military tribunals by making them
more "courtlike"-more transparent, with more procedural protections, more independent
decision makers, and more input into their design by the legislative branch-the more these
modifications will eliminate the supposed "practical" advantages of having military tribunals
in the first place, yet without dispelling the fatal global perception of unfairness.
II. THE WAY FORWARD
Against this background, how should the United States pursue internationaljustice in the
months ahead? To ensure that the international community perceives that those convicted
" Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1430 (11 th Cir. 1995). The Eleventh Circuit's broad ruling
in the Cuban case would effectively treat alien detainees on Guantinamo as human beings without human rights.
That ruling conflicted, however, with earlier decisions by the Second Circuit and a Brooklyn federal court in-
volving Haitian refugees on Guantinamo. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F. 2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated
as moot on other grounds, 113 S.Ct. 3028 (1993) (finding substantial likelihood that alien detainees on Guantinamo
do have due process rights); Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 823 F.Supp. 1028, 1042 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), vacated by set-
tlement (finding the same on the tnerits after a full bench trial). I should disclose that I served as counsel of record
for both the Haitian and the Cuban refugees in the Guantsinamo cases discussed here.
27 Cf Harold Hongju Koh, America's Offshore Refugee Camps, 29 RICHMOND L. REv. 139,140-41 (1994) ("[T]he
United States government has consistently asserted-and some courts have agreed-that these offshore locations
constitute 'righ ts-free zones,' where [alien detainees] lack any legal rights cognizable under U.S. law and American
[lawyers] lack First Amendment rights to communicate with them.").
21 See UN Human Rights Expert Concerned over Miltmy Order Signed by United States President, UN NEWSLETrER
(United Nations information Centre New Delhi) (Nov. 24, 2001), at <http://vw.tinic.org.in> (urgent appeal of
UN Special Rapporteur for the Independence of the Judiciary Param Cumaraswamy, calling Military Order
regrettable for "the wrong signals it sent, not only in the United States, but around the world").
"See, e.g., Sam Dillon with Donald G. McNeilJr., Spain Sets Hurdle for Extraditions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001,
at A] (suggesting that Spain will not extradite its suspects to U.S. military tribunal).
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for the September 11 attacks will receive fair and impartialjustice, the United States should
send suspects only to standing tribunals that have demonstrated their capacity to dispense
such justice in the past.
While I have long supported international adjudication, I am skeptical about the inter-
national community's ability to overcome existing political obstacles and create a fair inter-
national tribunal quickly."' International tribunals make the most sense when there is no func-
tioning municipal court that could fairly and efficiently try the case, as happened in the form-
er Yugoslavia and Rwanda. But even if the United States government were to support such
a tribunal here (which it seems unlikely to do), at least two other permanent members of
the Security Council-Russia and China-would probably withhold their consent from any
body that might pursue trials ofChechen or Uighur rebels whom they have labeled as domes-
tic "terrorists." Recent history shows that building new international tribunals from scratch
is slow and expensive and requires arduous negotiations. :  Although proponents claim that
an international tribunal would be more likely to be viewed as impartial than a U.S. court,
it is unclear why an ad hoc tribunal created for the express purpose of trying the September
I 1 terrorists and their supporters would find greater acceptance throughout the Muslim
world than thejudgments of a civilian court system that has been in place for more than two
centuries. Finally, those who believe that an international tribunal with M uslimjudges would
ensure "Muslim buy-in" into the international adjudicatory process should recall that the
last United Nations gathering before September 11 was the World Conference Against Rac-
ism, in which several Islamic countries sought to use the forum to pursue their political griev-
ances against Israel. " Many of the same countries would doubtless use their diplomatic clout
to argue that any UN tribunal to try terrorists should also tn Israeli officials who bore no
connection to the September 11 attacks, an alternative that potential Western signatories
to the tribunal would surely reject. We should not conclude, therefore, that only interna-
tional tribunals can grant meaningful justice for international crimes. Absent extant, func-
tioning international tribunals, the most crediblejustice wsill be delivered by time-tested do-
mestic judicial institutions, such as the United States' Article III courts and courts-martial.
In surveying itsjustice options, the United States should carefully distinguish between its
most pressing concern-redressing and preventing the murder of Americans on American
soil-and much broader efforts to support the creation of an enduring post-Taliban system
ofjustice in Afghanistan. Internationaljustice demands a clear and simple division of labor:
American prosecutors andjudges should try crimes committed against Americans on Amer-
ican soil, while experienced UN and international lawyers should address crimes committed
against Afghans on Afghan soil.
Cases primarily involving crimes in Afghanistan-whether committed by the Taliban or
the Northern Alliance-will be best addressed by rebuilding thejudicial system of Afghan-
istan itself, a task that, like the rebuilding of the Sierra Leonean, East Timorese, Bosnian, and
Kosovar legal systems, will require substantial and sustained international and UN input."
" Some distinguished scholars have argued that such cases should be heard before an international tribunal,
preferably one on which both American and Muslim judges sit. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Al Qaeda Should
Be Tried Before the World, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at A23. Bwt see MichaelJ. Matheson, U.S. Xilitav Commissions:
One of Several Options, 96 AJIL 354 (2002) (reviewing practical reasons why it remains unlikely that such a tribunal
will be created).
:" For example, the Sierra Leonean tribunal has yet to hear any cases several years after the mass killings there,
and a war crimes tribunal for Cambodia has yet to be set up more than twenty-five Years after the operative events.
See Seth Mydans, Khmer Rouge Trials Won't Be Fair, Critics Say, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 10, 2002, § 1, at 12.
32See Ellis Cose, Silver Linings from a Summit, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 17, 2001, at 40.
" The precise shape of the Afghan judicial system remains to be determined. I have no objection, for example,
to an Afghan tribunal that would combine domestic and international elements, such as the Sierra I.eonean tri-
bunal created under UN auspices is designed to do. Whatever happens, United Nations transitional support and
involvement will be critically necessary to stabilize the postconflict environment of Afghanistan, to promote the
Bonn process of building a representative post-Taliban government, and to address justice, accountability, and
truth telling about past human right- abuses by all parties to the Afghan conflict. This part of thejudicial problem,
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However heinous the offenses of Afghan war criminals against other Afghan citizens may
be, they have little to do with the United States, and should not be adjudicated by American
courts or courts-martial that have little interest or expertise in the decades-old Afghan con-
flict. Egregious Afghan violators such as Mullah Omar and his close deputies should be given
treatment similar to that given brutal rebel leader Foday Sankoh of Sierra Leone: namely,
arrest, humanitarian treatment in custody, permanent exclusion from further governmental
activity, no amnesty for war crimes or crimes against humanity, and eventual trial before the
emerging Afghanjudicial system. 4 Wherever possible, third-party combatants should be sent
back to the country of their nationality to face national punishment, with assurances that their
trials will strictly observe international due process standards.
Under this strategy, the U.S. government should send only those cases involving defen-
dants (such as leading Al Qaeda members) who are charged with or suspected of murdering
or plotting to murder American citizens on American soil to American civilian courts for
criminal trials by seasoned federal prosecutors. Since three Al Qaeda suspects-Zacarias
Moussaoui, the "American Taliban"John Walker Lindh, and the "sneaker bomber" Richard
Reid-have already been charged before U.S. civilian courts, I see no need to charge any
future defendants before untested and suspect military commissions."
In sum, the battle against global terrorism requires credible justice, which military com-
missions cannot provide. Credible international tribunals can provide credible justice but
may be difficult to create under the current political circumstances. That leaves standing civil-
ian courts or courts-martial that operate under preexisting and transparent rules. Sweeping
all "unlawful combatants" who have committed "war crimes" into untested, unwise, and le-
gally deficient U.S. military commissions will invite hostile foreign governments reciprocally
to "try" and execute captured nonuniformed American personnel before similar tribunals.
If the United States wants to show the world its commitment to the very rule of law that the
terrorists sought to undermine, it should take this opportunity to demonstrate that Amer-
ican courts can give universal justice.
HAROLD HONGJU KOH*
however, differs little from that faced in Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone, where the United States
similarly supported multilateral military operations that eventually secured a war-torn territory for a new, more
democratic government. What makes this military struggle distinctive-and the element thatengages U.S.judicial
jurisdiction-is that this conflict was triggered by the massive September 11 attacks that killed thousands of Amer-
ican and other civilians on American soil.
4 While I agree with much of Professor Matheson's sensible analysis, I disagree with his suggestion that persons
who commit violations of the law of armed conflict on the battlefield of Afghanistan but have no provable connec-
tion to the September 11 attacks should be tried before U.S. military commissions. Instead, I share his alternative
view: that "[elven for these persons, the alternative of trial ... by any suitable Afghan tribunals should be consid-
ered." Matheson, supra note 30, at 358.
My colleague Professor Wedgwood speculates that federal court trials of A] Qaeda suspects will jeopardize
classified information, limit available evidence, and endanger the security ofjudges andjurors. Ruth Wedgwood,
Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AJIL 328 (2002). Having dealt regularly with classified materials
and federal trials during stints at both the State andJustice Departments, I find these claims vastly overstated. As
one journalist has noted, during twenty-six successful federal prosecutions ofjihad supporters over the past eight
years, "[i ] either theJustice Department nor prosecutors in NewYork could recall for me a single specific instance
when national securitywas actually compromised during the trials in NewYork." Keller, supra note 6. Nor is it clear
why the potential excludability of some evidence should cripple prosecutors, given the huge volume of evidence
that will be amassed in what has regularly been called the largest criminal investigation in history. And although
extra security measures should doubtless be taken to ensure the safety of juries, judges, and prosecutors, such
measures have been taken routinely in the past, notjust in Al Qaeda cases, but also in numerous cases involving
organized crime, drug kingpins, and the like. In any event, it now seems clear that theJustice Department has not
deemed any of these concerns sufficiently serious to militate against charging Moussaoui, Reid, and Walker in
federal court. TheJustice Department's indictment practice so far thus casts serious doubt on Professor Wedgwood's
claim that "military commissions may be the most practicable course" for trials against Al Qaeda members. Wedgwood,
supra, at 330.
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